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Abstract 
We examine how the ownership of intellectual property rights influences patenting of 
university-discovered inventions. In 2002, Germany transferred patent rights from 
faculty members to their universities. To identify the effect on the volume of 
patenting, we exploit the researcher-level exogeneity of the 2002 policy change using a 
novel researcher-level panel database that includes a control group not affected by the 
law change. For professors who had existing industry connections, the policy 
decreased patenting, but for those without prior industry connections, it increased 
patenting. Overall, fewer university inventions were patented following the shift from 
inventor to institutional ownership.   
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1 Introduction 
Intellectual property (IP) policies are among the most powerful instruments shaping the 
incentives that drive the discovery and commercialization of knowledge.  For U.S. academic 
institutions the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 is perhaps the most influential and far-reaching of 
these IP policies. The legislation facilitated private institutional ownership of inventions 
discovered by researchers who were supported by federal funds. Many observers credit the 
Bayh-Dole Act with spurring university patenting and licensing that, in turn, stimulated 
innovation and entrepreneurship (The Economist 2002; OECD 2003; Stevens 2004). Based 
on this perceived success, the Bayh-Dole Act has become a model of university IP policy that 
is being debated and emulated in many countries around the world including Germany, 
Denmark, Japan, China, and others (OECD 2003; Mowery and Sampat 2005; So et al. 2008). 
The key component of the Bayh-Dole model is granting the university, not the inventor, 
ownership rights to patentable inventions discovered using public research funds (Crespi et 
al. 2006; Geuna and Nesta 2006; Kenney and Patton 2009).  However, the incentive effects 
on academic inventors of university versus individual ownership are not well understood. In 
a theoretical contribution, Hellmann (2007) found that university ownership is efficient 
when inventors must search for a commercial partner as long as the cost of search is higher 
for inventors than for the university.  Using survey and case study evidence, Litan et al. 
(2007) and Kenney and Patton (2009) argued that conflicting objectives and excessive 
bureaucracy make institutional ownership ineffective and suggest an individual ownership 
system may be superior.  Due to a paucity of evidence, however, the U.S. National Research 
Council recently concluded that “arguments for superiority of an inventor-driven system of 
technology transfer are largely conjectural” (NRC 2010). 
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Our analysis uses the framework of Pakes and Griliches (1984) and a quasi-experimental 
research design to provide the first systematic evidence on how intellectual property rights 
impact patenting of university-discovered inventions. We examine a fundamental change in 
German patent law from individual to institutional ownership.  Prior to 2002, university 
professors and researchers had exclusive intellectual property rights to their inventions.  
This “Professor’s Privilege” allowed university researchers to decide whether or not to 
patent and how to commercialize their discoveries, even if the underlying research was 
supported by public funds.  After 2002, universities were granted the intellectual property 
rights to all inventions made by their employees and this shifted the decision to patent from 
the researchers to the universities.  The policy goal was to increase patenting of university-
invented technologies which is often used as a surrogate indicator of successful university 
technology transfer. 
By changing the agent who makes the patenting decision, the abolishment of 
Professor’s Privilege caused a “regime shift” that substituted institutional benefit and cost 
schedules for those of the individual inventors.  The net effect on the volume of patenting 
depends primarily on the relative costs between the regimes.  To identify how the regime 
shift affected patenting, we exploit the researcher-level exogeneity of the 2002 abolishment 
of Professor’s Privilege along with the institutional structure of the German research system 
in which universities and other public research organizations (PROs) co-exist. PRO 
researchers were not affected by the ownership change and serve as a control group. We 
use a difference-in-difference methodology and control for the arrival of new patentable 
discoveries using publications and peer-to-peer matching. 
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Our analysis shows that fewer university inventions were patented following the 2002 
regime shift.  For a given discovery, the schedule of benefits to institutional owners, who are 
the post-change patent decision makers, is lower because the university became an 
additional party in the negotiations over the split of expected revenues.  This partly explains 
why fewer inventions qualified for patent protection following the regime shift.  However, 
the effect on expected revenues can be offset if institutional costs (broadly conceived) are 
sufficiently lower than those faced by individual researchers (Hellmann 2007). Our results 
show that institutional patenting costs were lower for the subset of university inventors 
who did not have relationships with industry partners prior to the policy change.  For those 
individuals, patenting increased.  But, the data also show that most German patenting 
professors had prior industry relationships.  Post-change institutional costs were not low 
enough to offset the revenue effect for this group.  Our results highlight the critical 
importance of understanding the nature and strength of faculty-industry relationships 
before undertaking policy initiatives intended to foster technology transfer.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
background and implementation of the law change in Germany.  Section 3 describes the 
Pakes and Griliches (1984) framework and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the 
empirical approach, the data collection strategy and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 
shows the econometric results, and robustness checks are presented in Section 6. The final 
section 7 concludes with a discussion of the implications for policy. 
2 The regime change: from inventor to university ownership 
In February 2002, the German Federal Government launched a comprehensive new 
program called “Knowledge Creates Markets” to stimulate technology transfer from 
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universities to private industry for innovation and economic growth1.  The program was 
largely a reaction to the “European paradox” (European commission 1995).  At that time, 
policymakers believed that Germany had one of the world’s leading scientific research 
enterprises, but was lagging the United States in terms of technology transfer and 
commercialization.  The new program addressed a wide spectrum of science-industry 
interactions including processes and guidelines governing knowledge transfer, science-
based spin-offs, collaboration, and the exploitation of scientific knowledge in the private 
sector.  The abolishment of Professor’s Privilege was one of the most significant changes 
from both a legal and cultural perspective.  Professor’s Privilege originated from Article 5 of 
the German constitution that protects the freedom of science and research.  The new 
program repealed Clause 42 of the German employee invention law that had granted 
university researchers - as the only occupational group in Germany - the privilege to retain 
the ownership rights to their inventions that otherwise rest with the employer2. 
Under the new law, German university researchers are required to cull their research 
findings for inventions and report any inventions to the university – unless the researcher 
decides to keep his or her inventions secret by not publishing or patenting. The university 
has four months to consider any submitted inventions for patenting.  If the university does 
not claim the invention, the rights to pursue patenting and commercialization are returned 
to the researcher.  If the university does claim the invention, the inventor receives at least 
30% of the revenues from successful commercialization, but nothing otherwise. 
Furthermore, the university handles the patenting process and pays all related expenses 
                                                     
1
 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung and Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 
(2001), Wissen schafft Märkte - Aktionsprogramm der Bundesregierung. 
2
 Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererfindungen in der im Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Gliederungsnummer 422-1, 
veröffentlichten bereinigten Fassung, das zuletzt durch Artikel 7 des Gesetzes vom 31. Juli 2009 (BGBl. I S. 
2521) geändert worden ist. 
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such as processing fees, translation costs and legal expenses. University researchers retain 
the right to disclose the invention through publication two months after submitting the 
invention to the university. Prior contractual agreements with third parties also remained 
valid during a prescribed transition period.3 
At the time of the law change, German universities had little experience undertaking 
technology transfer activities, and only a few universities maintained professionally 
managed technology transfer offices (TTOs) (cf. e.g. Schmoch et al., 2000). Therefore  the 
government decided to support the commercialization activities by establishing regional 
patent valorization agencies (PVAs), which was supported with a budget of 46.2 million EUR 
to be used before the end of 2004 (Kilger und Bartenbach 2002).  Universities were free to 
choose whether to use the PVAs’ services or not. To date, 29 PVAs serve different regional 
university networks and employ experts specialized in these universities’ research areas.  
The PVAs support the entire process from screening inventions, finding industry partners, 
and determining fruitful commercialization paths.  They are also supposed to promote 
collaboration between their member universities and industry.   
To date, a handful of prior studies have examined the effects of abolishing Professor’s 
Privilege on patenting rates and ownership patterns in Germany.  Schmoch (2007) found 
that the number of university-owned patents increased.  Based on inventor lists, his data 
also suggested the most active faculty inventors were discouraged by the abolishment of 
Professor’s Privilege and that non-patenting professors were encouraged, which suggests 
the law changed the mix of inventors. In a follow-up study, Cuntz et al. (2012) showed that 
the share of university-owned inventions increased after 2002 while the share of 
                                                     
3
 Contracts made before July 18
th
 2001 were to be treated under the old law until February 2003 (Gesetz 
über Arbeitnehmererfindungen, § 43 ArbnErfG). 
 6 
 
individually or industry- owned university inventions decreased. Von Proff et al. (2012) 
found that the policy change did not increase university-invented patents.  They also 
suggested an ownership shift from individual and firm-owned patents to universities.4  Our 
analysis extends this work by combining an established economic framework with a 
stronger research design and a more comprehensive researcher-level database allowing the 
identification of causal effects of the law change. 
3 Economic framework and hypotheses 
In economic models, patents reflect the combined influence of an agent’s propensity to 
patent and the arrival of new knowledge through the agent’s inventive process. 
(1)  (𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 = (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 ∙ (𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 
Pakes and Griliches (1984) called this relation the patent indicator function.  The propensity 
to patent can change due to legal or economic conditions that affect the expected benefits 
and costs of having a patent.  It captures the decision to patent.  In equation (1), increments 
to knowledge reflect investments into discovery, which Pakes and Griliches summarized as 
the “knowledge production function.”  Their analysis focused on the relationship between 
new knowledge and the volume of patenting, holding the propensity to patent constant.  In 
this paper, we focus on how the volume of patents responds to changes in the propensity to 
patent, holding increments to knowledge constant.5,6  
                                                     
4 Other studies consider the effects of patent ownership rights in other European countries. Examples are 
Valentin and Jensen (2007), Lissoni et al. (2009, 2013), Della Malva et al. (2013). For a broader discussion of 
academic patenting in Europe see Lissoni (2013).  
5
 A substantial literature has emerged that examines how commercial incentives influence the rate, 
direction, and disclosure of academic research.  This literature focuses on the knowledge production function 
component of equation (1).  Some references include:  Jensen and Thursby (2001, 2004); Banal-Estanol and 
Macho-Stadler (2010); Thursby et al. (2007); Lach and Schankerman (2008); Dechenaux et al. (2009); Azoulay 
et al. (2007, 2009), Czarnitzki et al. (2011, 2014). 
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Germany’s abolishment of Professor’s Privilege exogenously changed the agent 
responsible for the decision to patent university-discovered inventions.  In terms of 
equation (1), the law transferred the propensity to patent from the faculty inventor to the 
university.  Under the former Professor Privilege system, faculty inventors would apply for 
patents on their discoveries when the expected benefits of patent protection were greater 
than the costs.  Since 2002, faculty members no longer make this choice, but instead must 
disclose any inventions to the university.  The university, perhaps with the PVA, decides to 
apply for a patent based on its assessment of expected benefits and costs.  Consequently, 
the effect of revoking Professor’s Privilege on the volume of patents depends on how the 
expected benefit and cost schedules shift due to the regime change from the individual 
faculty inventor to the university. 
For any set of discoveries, the schedule of expected benefits considered by the 
university after the regime change is lower than the schedule of benefits faced by any 
faculty member prior to the abolishment of Professor’s Privilege.  After the policy change, 
the share of revenue appropriable by the university is limited by three-way bargaining 
between the university, the faculty member, and the licensee company.  Under reasonable 
assumptions about bargaining power and recognizing that the university cannot increase 
the market value of the discovery, the university will capture a smaller share of the 
expected revenue stream in three-way bargaining than the faculty member would under 
two-way bargaining (Frank et al. 2007; Hellmann 2007).7  If the university and faculty cost 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6
 We recognize the regime shift could have an indirect influence on patenting through the knowledge 
production function; however, proprer analysis of this effect would require a separate model focusing on new 
knowledge (i.e. publications) instead of patents.   
7
 Under Professor’s Privilege, the faculty member also had a stronger bargaining position for obtaining 
non-pecuniary benefits associated with collaborative research and technology development. These non-
pecuniary benefits would further reduce the university‘s benefit schedule relative to the faculty member. 
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schedules were the same, the reduction in benefits after abolishment of Professor’s 
Privilege would lead to fewer patents.  Put simply, the policy change would decrease the 
propensity to patent. 
At that time, however, policy makers believed the cost schedules faced by universities 
would be lower than those faced by individual faculty members.  They interpreted the small 
share of university-owned patents in Germany prior to 2002 as evidence that individual 
researchers could not afford to undertake the costly and time-consuming process of 
applying for a patent and pursuing potential licensees (Becher et al. 1996).  If the costs of 
patenting for universities were sufficiently lower, the volume of university inventions 
receiving patents could increase.  So, the net effect of the regime shift on the volume of 
patenting depends on the costs of the universities compared to the pre-policy costs of 
faculty inventors. 
It is important to remember that the propensity to patent incorporates the benefits and 
costs of patenting that are expected upon commercialization.  The expected revenues from 
commercialization are compared to the expected costs of achieving commercialization both 
with and without patent protection.  The relevant concept of costs is broader than simply 
the patent application fees and legal fees.  It also includes costs from searching for an 
industry partner for commercialization, development costs, and so forth.  While these costs 
may be close to homogeneous across universities in the post-policy change period, they are 
likely to be heterogeneous within the population of university inventors before the 
abolishment of Professor’s Privilege.   
We can identify two groups in the population of university inventors who faced 
significantly different costs of patenting under Professor’s Privilege.  The first group consists 
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of university inventors who had relationships with one or more industry partners.  These 
individuals already paid the costs of searching for licensee companies and negotiating their 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.  In these relationships, industry partners would 
typically pay the application and legal fees, manage the development process and 
commercialize the product or service.  For this group of “low cost” university inventors, the 
regime shift to institutional ownership almost surely led to a higher cost schedule as the 
university, possibly through the PVA, had to renegotiate established relationships (Frank et 
al. 2007; Kilger and Bartenbach 2002).  For this group, we expect the regime shift in the 
propensity to patent led to a lower benefits schedule and a higher cost schedule.  Our first 
hypothesis is: 
H1: Faculty members who had established connections to industry partners  
 experienced a decrease in the volume of patenting, ceteris paribus. 
The second group consists of university inventors who did not have a relationship with 
an industry partner.  These individuals obtained a patent, but still needed to search for a 
licensee company and negotiate pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.  For this group of 
“high cost” university inventors, the university may have a considerable cost advantage.  
The cost advantage could stem from many sources.  Hellmann (2007) postulates that a TTO 
(or PVA) may have a comparative advantage in identifying potential industry partners due to 
the efforts of specialized managers or, on the licensee’s side, a single institutional source 
may make it easier to find university discoveries (e.g. Debackere and Veugelers 2005; Siegel 
et al. 2003). For this group, we expect the post-policy cost schedule shifted downward more 
than the post-policy benefits schedule.  Our second hypothesis is: 
H2: Faculty members who did not have established connections with industry partners  
 experienced an increase in the volume of patenting, ceteris paribus. 
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With cost heterogeneity in the population of university inventors, the net effect of the 
policy change depends on the share of inventors of each type.  If the pre-policy inventor 
population was predominantly low cost faculty inventors, then the net effect of the policy 
would be to reduce the volume of patents.  Whereas, the policy would increase the volume 
of patenting of university-discovered inventions if faculty inventors were mostly high cost.  
As discussed in the data section, most patenting professors were in the low cost group 
before the policy change.  
4 Empirical model and data 
 Identification Strategy and Estimation Approach 4.1
The German policy change provides a unique opportunity to separate the influence of the 
propensity to patent from the influence of new knowledge on the volume of patenting.  The 
abolishment of Professor’s Privilege was an exogenous “shock” to the propensity to patent 
university inventions.  As seen in equation (1), once new knowledge is held constant, this 
exogenous variation will identify the effect of the propensity to patent on the volume of 
patenting.  In the literature on academic research, publications are the accepted standard 
for measuring knowledge production.  The database compiled for this analysis includes 
complete publication histories for university inventors and their peers in non-university, 
public research organizations (PROs) such as the Max Planck, Fraunhofer, and Helmholtz 
institutes as well as other federal and state research institutions.8  
                                                     
8
  Major research institutions in Germany are not only universities but other public research institutions 
that have many branches in a variety of different scientific disciplines. For instance, the Fraunhofer Society has 
59 institutes in Germany with about 17,000 employees, the Max Planck Society has 76 institutes with about 
12,000 employees. The Leibniz Association employs 16,100 people in 86 research centers. The Helmholtz 
Association has about 30,000 employees in 16 research centers. 
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We identify the policy effect using a difference-in-difference (DiD) research design with 
university inventors as the treatment group and PRO researchers as the control group.  Like 
university professors, PRO researchers conduct academic research at publicly funded 
institutions in Germany.  They work in similar academic fields and experience similar 
changes in research opportunities that affect the discovery of new knowledge.  But unlike 
university professors, PRO researchers did not have Professor’s Privilege and the patent 
rights to their inventions were always owned by the institution.  To further control for 
changes in research opportunities, we use peer-to-peer matching between university faculty 
members and PRO researchers based on characteristics such as publications, scientific 
discipline, and career age before undertaking DiD estimation. Our DiD setup also accounts 
for common macroeconomic trends and individual-specific unobserved effects that capture 
an academic inventor’s “taste” for patenting and commercialization.   
For the population of German academic inventors, the DiD model takes the following 
form: 
(2) 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑒
2)𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽4(3𝑦𝑟𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the volume of patents by researcher i applied for in year t (i.e. researcher-
year observations).  The policy effect is captured by the coefficient 𝛽1 of the interaction 
term (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 ∙ 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦).  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the 
inventor is a university professor and 0 when the inventor is a PRO researcher.  𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 following the policy change, 2002 onward, and 
0 otherwise.  A quadratic specification of career age captures inventor life-cycle effects.  We 
use a three year moving average of past research publications, (3𝑦𝑟𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1, to 
capture the arrival of new knowledge. 𝛿𝑖 is a researcher-level fixed effect and 𝛾𝑡 is a vector 
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of time dummy variables covering 2-year periods.  Note that the professor dummy variable 
gets absorbed into the researcher fixed effects. Similarly, the new policy dummy variable 
gets absorbed by the general time trend.   
As patent counts take only nonnegative integer values, we use the fixed effects Poisson 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE).  As a member of the linear exponential family 
of distributions, the Poisson QMLE produces consistent estimates of the population 
parameters as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified (Gourieroux et al. 1984; 
Wooldridge 1999).  We use robust standard errors to account for any over- or under-
dispersion. 
 Data and descriptive statistics  4.2
As the aim of this research is to examine the effects of abolishing Professor’s Privilege on 
the decision to patent university-discovered inventions, we focus on German academic 
inventors.  This population includes all researchers affiliated with a university or PRO who 
appeared as an inventor on at least one patent submitted to the German or European 
Patent Offices between 1978 and 2008. Academic inventors are a subpopulation of all 
academic researchers in Germany. The broader population includes academic researchers 
who only published.  However, the transfer of patent rights to institutional ownership did 
not impact these researchers as they never participated in the intellectual property system 
over the entire time period. 
We constructed a researcher-level panel dataset of academic inventors following a 
multistep procedure, which is summarized in Appendix A. This process yielded a sample 
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with 3,718 professors and 8,294 PRO researchers.9 We defined the study period to extend 
from 1995 through 2008 so that we observed enough time periods before and after the 
policy change.  For each inventor, our data contains the individual’s history of patenting 
between 1978 and 2008 and the individual’s history of publications between 1990 and 
2008.  Beyond patent and publication characteristics, this information allowed us to 
calculate each researcher’s career age which is used to model quadratic life cycle effects in 
equation (2).  Career age starts when we observe the researcher’s first publication or patent 
application and increases incrementally thereafter to a maximum of 35 years after which we 
assume the researcher retires.  To account for earlier exit, we adopted a 5-year rule that has 
a researcher leaving the panel if he or she had no patenting or publishing activity for five 
consecutive years.10  Researcher industry connections were determined from the patent 
data.  An academic researcher is identified as having an industry connection when he or she 
is observed as an inventor on a company owned patent.  This allows us to distinguish high 
cost and low cost academic inventors prior to the abolishment of Professor’s Privilege and 
to estimate the model on subsamples to test hypotheses 1 and 2. The estimation sample 
contains 108,263 researcher-year observations.  All of the variables used in the analysis are 
described in Table  in Appendix A.   
Figure 1 shows the average number of patents per inventor for university and PRO 
researchers over time.  To better compare the trends, annual patents were normalized 
using 1995 as the reference year (i.e. each data point is relative to 1995).  In the years 
leading up to the policy change, the trends in patents by professors and PRO researchers 
                                                     
9
 This sample excludes those researchers who were employed at both a PRO and university, as it is not 
clear which patent regime applied to these researchers.  
10
 In section 6 we present an alternative exit rule; however, the results do not change in a meaningful 
way.  
 14 
 
were quite similar.  Both series show a peak in 1998 and a downward trend up to 2002.  
After the abolishment of Professor’s Privilege in 2002, the patenting trends diverge with 
university professors showing a steeper downward trend than PRO researchers.  This 
suggests that abolishing Professor’s Privilege led to an overall decrease in the volume of 
patenting of university-discovered inventions and highlights the importance of using a 
control group for analyzing the policy change.  
Figure 1: Trends in German patenting for university and public research 
 organization (PRO) researchers (relative to 1995), 1995-2008. 
 
Finding a decrease in patents per researcher after 1998 was somewhat surprising 
because it does not mirror the overall trend in German patent applications over this period.  
Upon further inquiry, the same pattern for academic patents was found by prior researchers 
(Cuntz et al., 2012; Schmoch 2007; Von Proff et al. 2012).  These authors and others have 
speculated about the reasons for the decrease.  Some suggestions include an increased 
emphasis on publications in academic performance evaluations, decreased entry into 
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academic jobs, the end of the New Economy boom, and legal uncertainties surrounding 
patenting in the field of biotechnology (Cuntz et al. 2012, p.21-22; Schmoch 2007, p. 5-8). 
As described in section 3, the overall effect of the policy depends on the composition of 
university inventors prior to the regime change.  If most patenting professors were in the 
low cost group, the policy would reduce university patenting.  The data show that 2,657 
(71%) of the university inventors had at least one patent before 2002 and 78% of these 
inventors had existing industry connections. It is clear that most university inventors were 
low cost.   Among PRO inventors, 5,008 (80%) had patented before the law change and 44% 
of these inventors had industry connections.   The lower percentage of PRO inventors with 
industry connections probably reflects the institutional ownership system already in place 
for these researchers.   
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics at the researcher-year level for university professors 
(i.e. the treatment group) and PRO researchers (i.e. the control group) separated into the 
pre- and post-policy change periods.  These groups are further subdivided into those with 
industry connections in the top portion of the table and those without industry connections 
in the bottom portion.  Looking at academic inventors with industry connections, mean 
patents by professors declined by  44% after the abolishment of Professor’s Privilege while 
patenting by PRO researchers declined by  27%.  Among those without industry connections, 
mean patents by professors increased 55% after the law change, but only 9% for PRO 
researchers.  These findings are consistent with the hypothesized effects discussed in 
Section 3.  Citation-weighted patents, which partially adjust the raw counts for the “quality” 
of the inventions, also fell more for professors than PRO researchers among those with 
industry connections.  While the average number of patents by university professors 
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without industry connections increased by 55%, the citation-weighted patents actually fell 
by 15%.  The differences in career age show that university professors were slightly older 
than PRO researchers over the whole sample period.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the treatment and control groups  
 (researcher-year observations)  
  Prior to law change (1995-2001) After law change (2002-2008) 
 
Professors with industry connection 
  N =  12508 researcher-years N = 9141 researcher-years 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# Patents 0.88 2.02 0 64 0.49 1.50 0 28 
# Citation-weighted  
0.67 2.78 0 119 0.27 1.43 0 39 
patents 
Career age 9.86 6.74 0 34 16.25 6.73 2 35 
Avg. publications  2.75 5.51 0 67.33 4.13 6.97 0 67 
 
Control group with industry connection 
  N =  13101 researcher-years N =  9854 researcher-years 
# Patents 1.01 1.98 0 44 0.73 1.70 0 26 
# Citation-weighted  
0.81 2.55 0 55 0.42 1.68 0 41 
patents 
Career age 8.06 6.02 0 34 14.22 6.43 2 35 
Avg. publications  1.21 3.41 0 110.67 2.00 3.95 0 64.67 
 
Professors without industry connection 
  N = 6633  researcher-years N = 8121 researcher-years 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# Patents 0.20 0.59 0 11 0.31 0.84 0 27 
# Citation-weighted  
0.13 0.75 0 15 0.15 0.77 0 19 
patents 
Career age 5.71 3.89 0 27 9.35 5.92 0 32 
Avg. publications  3.03 5.73 0 100.67 3.63 7.07 0 80.67 
 
Control group without industry connection 
  N = 19855 researcher-years N =  29050 researcher-years 
# Patents 0.34 0.76 0 13 0.37 0.93 0 24 
# Citation-weighted  
0.22 0.92 0 16 0.21 1.07 0 61 
patents 
Career age 4.50 4.06 0 29 7.16 5.53 0 35 
Avg. publications  1.12 2.51 0 44 1.32 2.89 0 63.67 
Note: Avg. publications are a three-year moving average of publication counts in t-1 for each researcher.  
5 Econometric Results 
Our baseline results identify the treatment effect of Germany’s 2002 policy change that 
transferred patent ownership rights from inventors to the universities on the decision to 
 17 
 
patent.  Table 2 presents the parameter estimates based on Poisson QMLE with robust 
standard errors.  The overall treatment effect, which is revealed by the coefficient on 
(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 ∙ 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦) in column 2, is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
This indicates that the overall effect of abolishing Professor’s Privilege was to decrease the 
volume of patents obtained on university-discovered inventions in Germany.  It is 
economically significant as well.  Holding the arrival of new knowledge and researcher life 
cycle effects constant, the coefficient estimate shows the volume of university patents 
decreased by 18%, on average.  At least in part, this result reflects the reduction in benefits 
appropriable by universities after the abolishment of Professor’s Privilege due to three-way 
bargaining.  It would fully describe the effect of the 2002 policy change if university and 
faculty cost schedules were the same.  Turning to the arrival of new knowledge, as captured 
by a three year moving average of past publications, increases patents by academic 
inventors with one additional publication boosting expected patents by 14%.  
The overall effect, however, masks potential heterogeneous treatment effects due to 
differences in patent and commercialization costs before the policy change.  Even with the 
reduction in benefits appropriable by the university, the effect of the policy change on the 
volume of patenting depends on the costs of the university compared to costs of faculty 
inventors before the transition to institutional ownership.  In Section 3, we argued that 
faculty with prior industry connections were relatively low cost and postulated that the 
decrease in patent volume due to the policy change would be even larger for this group.  As 
seen in column 3 of Table 2, this hypothesis is supported.  In the subsample of academic 
inventors with industry connections, the expected number of university patents decreased 
by 26%, holding other factors constant.   
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For faculty without prior industry connections, we postulated that cost advantages for 
universities would offset the reduction in benefits and increase patenting. As seen in column 
6 of Table 2, treatment effect for this subsample is positive and significant at the 1% level.  
Holding the arrival of new knowledge and researcher life cycle effects constant, the 
estimate shows the volume of university patents increased by 39%, on average.  For faculty 
without prior industry connections life cycle effects are statistically stronger while the link 
between publications and patents is still positive and significant. As seen in the subsample 
breakout, the overall decrease in patenting of university-discovered inventions reflects the 
composition of university inventors before the regime change – most inventors had pre-
existing connections with industry.   
Table 2: Poisson models of patenting output 
# Patents Overall With industry connection Without industry 
connection 
 Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. 
Err.  
Professor*NewPolicy -0.184*** (0.053) -0.262*** (0.067) 0.391*** (0.085) 
Career age -0.028** (0.014) -0.030 (0.019) -0.106*** (0.020) 
Career age squared/100 0.002 (0.028) -0.064* (0.038) 0.721*** (0.065) 
Avg publications 0.028*** (0.005) 0.017*** (0.005) 0.045*** (0.007) 
Time dummies (base 1995)       
1996-1997 0.136*** (0.033) 0.160*** (0.039) 0.090 (0.062) 
1998-1999 0.210*** (0.052) 0.304*** (0.066) 0.008 (0.086) 
2000-2001 0.189** (0.075) 0.307*** (0.098) -0.002 (0.113) 
2002-2003 0.087 (0.097) 0.184 (0.129) -0.099 (0.144) 
2004-2005 0.094 (0.118) 0.189 (0.156) -0.117 (0.175) 
2006-2007 0.034 (0.139) 0.127 (0.186) -0.232 (0.203) 
2008 -0.068 (0.157) 0.115 (0.210) -0.446* (0.228) 
# obs. 108,263 44,604 63,659 
# obs. PRO researchers 71,860 22,955 48,905 
# obs. professors 36,403 21,649 14,754 
# obs. Professors after policy change 17,262 9,141 8,121 
Robust standard errors. Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Note: Avg. publications are a three-year moving average of publication counts in t-1 for each researcher.  
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Conditional Difference-in-Difference 
One important characteristic of our control group is that they are German academic 
researchers.  Like university professors, these individuals understand the literatures in their 
disciplines as well as other developments in their fields.  Peer-to-peer matching can help 
control for potential changes in research opportunities.  We constructed a matched sample 
of university professors and PRO researchers by applying caliper matching (caliper threshold 
= 0.005) to identify the nearest neighbor for each university professor.  The inventors were 
matched based on their career achievements in 1998 (4 years prior to policy change) using 
their publication count, publication subject field11 and career age.  We estimate the DiD 
specification in equation (2) using observations from 1999 through 2008.  
The treatment effects from the abolishment of Professor’s Privilege are quite similar in 
magnitude and significance to those presented in Table 2.  The overall treatment effect 
indicates that patents on university-discovered inventions decreased by 19% instead of 18%, 
on average.  Among those university inventors with prior industry connections, patents 
decreased by the same magnitude, 26%.  The magnitude of the treatment effect for 
university faculty who were previously high-cost increased by four percentage points and 
now indicates the policy increased patenting for this group by 43%, on average.   
                                                     
11
 The subject fields of the publications have been assigned based on the classification in the ISI Web of 
Science Citation Index /Science Citation Index. We followed Leydesdorff and Rafols (2009) and defined 18 
aggregated publication fields.  A researcher has been allocated to one of these aggregated fields by using the 
field occurring most frequently in his or her publication record. 
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Table 3: Conditional Difference-in-Difference Poisson models of patenting output 
# Patents Overall With industry connection Without industry 
connection 
 Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  
Professor*New Policy -0.19** 0.09 -0.26** 0.11 0.43*** 0.13 
Time dummies (base 1998-1999)       
2000-2001 -0.10** 0.05 -0.16*** 0.05 0.23** 0.11 
2002-2003 -0.23*** 0.08 -0.34*** 0.10 0.18 0.12 
2004-2005 -0.31*** 0.09 -0.44*** 0.11 0.17 0.13 
2006-2007 -0.35*** 0.10 -0.58*** 0.13 0.35*** 0.13 
2008 -0.38*** 0.12 -0.60*** 0.16 0.29** 0.14 
Observations 33728 18591 15137 
Robust standard errors. Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
6 Robustness checks 
 Citation-weighted patent volume 6.1
It is well known that the economic value distribution associated with patents is highly 
skewed with a very small number of patents accounting for most of the value created 
through invention.  So, even though the German policy change reduced the volume of 
patents, one might wonder whether the policy change simply eliminated the low value 
patents and thereby resulted in a smaller quantity of higher quality patents.  To address this 
issue, forward citations are commonly used to weight raw patent counts as a way to 
partially adjust for the unobserved quality of inventions (Trajtenberg 1990).  
Table 4 reports the results from applying the DiD research design to citation-weighted 
patents.  As before, the parameters are estimated using Poisson QMLE with robust standard 
errors.  From column 2, the overall treatment effect from revoking Professors Privilege was 
to reduce the volume of university citation-weighed patents by 27%, holding the arrival of 
new knowledge and researcher life cycle effects constant.  For university professors who 
had prior industry connections, university citation-weighed patents fell by 25%, on average.  
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However, for university professors who did not have prior industry connections, the results 
are different from those found previously.  While the volume of un-weighted patents 
increased for this group, citation-weighted patents show no significant change.  This 
suggests that while the new policy increased the volume of patenting by professors without 
industry connections, it did not improve the average quality of these inventions.  Among the 
other covariates, the only notable difference is that new knowledge is no longer significantly 
related to citation-weight patents among professors with prior industry connections.  
Table 4: Poisson models of Citation-weighted patenting output 
# Citation-weighted patents Overall With industry connection Without industry 
connection 
 Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  
Professor*NewPolicy -0.274*** (0.086) -0.254** (0.104) 0.103 (0.147) 
Career age -0.072*** (0.026) -0.061* (0.035) -0.179*** (0.044) 
Career age squared/100 -0.000 (0.045) -0.052 (0.058) 0.797*** (0.135) 
Avg publications 0.014** (0.007) 0.002 (0.008) 0.026** (0.011) 
Time dummies (base 1995)       
1996-1997 0.111* (0.065) 0.113 (0.077) 0.097 (0.116) 
1998-1999 0.337*** (0.106) 0.373*** (0.130) 0.217 (0.177) 
2000-2001 0.099 (0.147) 0.153 (0.184) -0.019 (0.237) 
2002-2003 0.062 (0.195) -0.003 (0.250) 0.123 (0.308) 
2004-2005 0.211 (0.237) 0.134 (0.304) 0.275 (0.372) 
2006-2007 0.143 (0.283) -0.048 (0.356) 0.267 (0.450) 
2008 -0.318 (0.318) -0.389 (0.408) -0.310 (0.496) 
Observations 64,030 32,300 31,730 
Robust standard errors. Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Note: Avg. publications are a three-year moving average of publication counts in t-1 for each researcher.  
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 Exclusion of pre-policy uncertainty period 6.2
As part of our research process, we reviewed the public discussion regarding the 
abolishment of Professor’s Privilege.  The possibility of a policy change became public as 
early as December 1997 when the German Federal Council requested the federal 
government to review the efficacy and appropriateness of Professor’s Privilege.  At that 
time, some policy makers were concerned that only 4% of all German patents originated 
from universities.12 As discussed in section 3, they believed professors were not willing or 
able to invest the time and money for commercialization, but focused instead on 
publications.   After this initial inquiry, Professor’s Privilege was debated through March 
2001 when the federal government published its action plan for enhanced science-to-
industry technology transfer that officially announced the abolishment of the Professor’s 
Privilege.  When the final version of the law was published in October 2001, it was clear that 
Professor’s Privilege would be abolished effective February 2002.  
To verify that the timing of the policy change does not affect our findings, we exclude 
this described pre-policy “uncertainty period” from the sample, and compare academic 
patenting in 1995-1997 (before the law change and before the public discussion has been 
initiated) with the time period after the law change, 2002-2008.  As seen in Table 5, the 
coefficient magnitudes on the treatment effects are larger.  The effect of new knowledge 
through publications is smaller, but statistically significant across all specifications.    
                                                     
12
 This was discussed in many German newspapers at the time. An example can be found in “Der Spiegel” 
which is one of the most prominent weekly news magazines in Germany (see 
http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/patentoffensive-bulmahn-will-hochschullehrerprivileg-
abschaffen-a-101092.html). Our data also shows that about 4% of all patents applied for at the German Patent 
Office and the European Patent Office were university-invented patents. For instance, in 1995 there were 
320,000 patents applied for by German inventors at the German Patent Office and the European Patent Office. 
Out of these, we find 4.7% to be university-inventions. In 2000, there were 460,000 patents out of which 3.3% 
originated from universities. 
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Table 5: Poisson models of patenting using only 1995-1997 as pre-treatment time 
periods 
# Patents Overall With industry connection 
Without industry 
connection 
 
Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  
Professor*NewPolicy -0.230*** (0.069) -0.328*** (0.084) 0.827*** (0.152) 
Career age -0.014 (0.017) 0.012 (0.025) -0.139*** (0.025) 
Career age squared/100 -0.078** (0.031) -0.102** (0.041) 0.531*** (0.069) 
Avg. publications 0.030*** (0.006) 0.020*** (0.007) 0.041*** (0.009) 
Year dummies (base 1995)       
1996-1997 0.082** (0.037) 0.084* (0.046) 0.017 (0.067) 
2002-2003 0.245* (0.128) 0.036 (0.180) 0.549*** (0.179) 
2004-2005 0.235 (0.154) -0.035 (0.216) 0.607*** (0.219) 
2006-2007 0.156 (0.181) -0.166 (0.254) 0.583** (0.254) 
2008 0.055 (0.203) -0.229 (0.285) 0.468* (0.284) 
Observations 64037 25986 38051 
Robust standard errors. Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Note: Avg. publications are a three-year moving average of publication counts in t-1 for each researcher.  
 
 Robustness test on the sample exit rule 6.3
For our main analysis we adopted a 5-year rule that has a researcher leaving the panel if he 
or she had no patenting or publishing activity for five consecutive years. This rule was 
necessary due to data limitations that prevent us from observing when a researcher retires 
or leaves academic employment.  To verify our results are not driven by this limitation, we 
imposed a very strict 2-year rule in which researchers are dropped after two consecutive 
years of inactivity.  The results using the strict exit rule are very similar to those found using 
the 5-year rule (Table 6). 
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Table 6: Poisson models of patenting using the 2-year exit rule 
# Patents Overall With industry connection Without industry 
connection 
 Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  Coef.    Std. Err.  
Professor*NewPolicy -0.172*** 0.055 -0.258*** 0.070 0.473*** 0.085 
Career age 0.008 0.015 -0.013 0.020 -0.032 0.021 
Career age squared/100 -0.093*** 0.033 -0.096** 0.044 0.432*** 0.064 
Avg. publications 0.020*** 0.005 0.011** 0.006 0.033*** 0.007 
Time dummies (base 1995)       
1996-1997 0.096*** 0.034 0.130*** 0.041 0.041 0.062 
1998-1999 0.212*** 0.056 0.327*** 0.070 -0.004 0.091 
2000-2001 0.188** 0.078 0.322*** 0.101 0.004 0.12 
2002-2003 0.068 0.103 0.201 0.137 -0.147 0.154 
2004-2005 0.079 0.124 0.189 0.163 -0.144 0.187 
2006-2007 0.006 0.146 0.118 0.195 -0.300 0.218 
2008 -0.078 0.165 0.15 0.221 -0.558** 0.244 
Observations 88666 37193 51473 
 
 Number of patenting researchers before and after the law change 6.4
The fixed effects regressions presented above estimate the treatment effect of the policy 
only for scientists that were in the academic system before the policy changed occurred. 
This is because of the nature of the fixed effects regressions: the treatment dummy, i.e. the 
policy change variable only changes from the value zero to one for scientists that were in 
the sample before 2002. If, however, researchers enter the system after 2002 patent more 
than earlier cohorts, the fixed effects regressions would not pick this up, as the policy 
change variable would always be equal to one for these researchers.. If the policy change 
attracted new entrants into academic patenting, it could have increased the total volume of 
patents. To check for this possibility, we analyze the trend in the number of patenting 
researchers before and after the law change in 2002 (see Figure 2). The graph shows that 
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the number of patenting professors shows a steady decline after 1999. This suggests that 
the policy change did not attract more professors into patenting. 
Figure 2: Number of patenting scientists before and after the law change. 
 
 
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we examine how the ownership of patent rights influences the decision to 
patent in the context of university-discovered inventions.  By changing the agent who makes 
the patenting decision, Germany’s abolishment of Professor’s Privilege in 2002 caused a 
regime shift that substituted institutional benefit and cost schedules for those of the 
individual inventors.  Our empirical approach exploits the institutional structure of the 
German public research system to identify an appropriate control group along with the 
researcher-level exogeneity of the policy change to implement a difference-in-difference 
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approach to causal inference. Our analysis shows that fewer university inventions were 
patented following the 2002 regime shift from inventor to institutional ownership.   
The German policy change that abolished Professor’s Privilege was based on the 
presumption that the costs and risks of patenting were so high that professors did not have 
sufficient incentives to patent their discoveries or pursue commercialization.  In retrospect, 
this presumption appears to be wrong.  We find that the treatment effect was 
heterogeneous among university professors and depended on the costs of the university 
compared to costs of faculty inventors before the transition to institutional ownership.  
Post-policy institutional patenting costs were lower for the subset of university inventors 
who did not have prior relationships with industry partners.  For those individuals, patenting 
increased after the policy change.  Yet, most German professors had prior connections with 
industry partners leading to higher patenting and commercialization costs under 
institutional ownership.  For these professors, patenting decreased substantially.  
While these findings reflect the medium-term effects of the law change, it could still be 
possible that the law change results in higher commercialization in the long-run, that is, 
when new faculty members enter academe who never experienced the old regime of 
inventor-ownership. However, trends in the number of patenting researchers until 2008 do 
not suggest more researchers patented after the law change. On the contrary, the number 
of patenting professors has declined, at least through 2008.  
One possible reason for the miscalculation by German policy makers is a failure to 
adequately assess the nature and extent of technology transfer and patenting relationships 
prior to the law change.  Informal and formal relationships between university researchers 
and industry firms had evolved under the Professor’s Privilege system. Our results highlight 
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the critical importance of understanding the nature and strength of faculty-industry 
relationships before undertaking policy initiatives intended to foster technology transfer.  
Our findings provide the strongest evidence to date that an inventor ownership system 
can produce more university-invented patents, and thereby more technology transfer, than 
an institutional ownership system.  Does this imply that other countries such as the U.S. 
would increase university technology transfer by adopting an inventor ownership system?  
Not necessarily.  The nature and strength of faculty-industry relationships will differ based 
on each country’s institutions, culture, and historical evolution of networks and trust 
relationships.  Rather than attempting a major policy change as was done in Germany, 
policymakers in other countries would benefit from a better understanding of current 
practices.  This information could be used to design incremental changes that allow 
technology transfer processes the flexibility and adaptability needed to fit alternative 
technologies and markets.   
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Appendix A: Data collection procedure 
Our relevant starting population for the patent collection are all patent applications filed at 
the German Patent and Trademark Office (DPMA) and the European Patent Office (EPO) 
involving at least one German inventor since 1978 up to 2011 using the PATSTAT database. 
These are 1,682,585 patent documents. Eventually we will collapse the list of relevant 
patent documents to the number of inventions, that is, we will account for patent families. 
Between 1978 and 2011 the grand total of patent families amounts to 1,067,753, and in the 
time period under review in this paper, 1995-2008, the number of different inventions with 
at least one German inventor amounts to 624,041. 
Searching patents invented by university faculty 
Unfortunately, no comprehensive list of German university faculty exists. Therefore, we 
follow another established strategy to identify patents of university professors (see e.g. 
Czarnitzki et al. 2007, 2009). In Germany, the award of a doctorate and even more of a 
professor title is considered a great honor. The “Dr.” is an official part of the name and is, 
for example, even mentioned in the national IDs and passports. The professor title is 
protected by the German criminal code (article 132a) against misuse by unauthorized 
persons. Accordingly this title is used as a name affix not only in academic environment, but 
also in daily life. Thus, we use the inventor records in the database and search for the title 
“Prof. Dr.” and a large number of variations of this. This initial search identified 69,250 
patent documents between 1978 and 2011.13 After having obtained an initial list of patent 
                                                     
13
 One may be concerned that the Professor Doctor title is also given as an honorary title to individuals 
who are not employed at universities.  While the granting of honorary titles seems to be relatively rare, some 
of these highly qualified individuals may be labeled as professors in our data process.  We believe any 
misclassification error would work against finding a significant policy effect as these individuals are not 
affected by the policy change. 
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documents, we then also searched for these inventors again in order to see whether they 
also patented without the “Prof. Dr.” title. Note that initially we just search for name 
homonyms of the identified “Prof. Dr.” patents. This step does not involve yet to 
disambiguate the records in order to find out which of these patents are invented by the 
same person and which are other inventors with similar names. The actual disambiguation is 
done at a later stage using cross-referencing to linked publication records. The search for 
name homonyms added 197,887 (1978-2011) to the 69,250 patent documents. We thus 
have a raw list of potentially university-invented patent documents of almost 270,000. 
Identifying patents by PRO researchers 
The identification of patents by PRO scientists is more straightforward, as they can be 
searched by applicant names as the IP was always subject to institutional ownership. We 
obtained a list of about 500 PRO institutes existing in Germany from the “Bundesbericht 
Forschung und Innovation 2012” published by the federal government. These were 
searched as applicants in the patent documents, and we identified 27,637 (1978-2011) 
patent documents. As some of these patents involve co-applications with firms, we cannot 
assume that all inventors listed on the patents are employees of PROs. Therefore, we first 
omit the co-assigned patens (about 20% of the 27,637). This detour is necessary in order to 
avoid that e.g. industry researchers whose employer appears as co-applicant on some 
patents enter our data of PRO inventors mistakenly. We then searched for all patents by the 
PRO inventors, in order to come up with a comprehensive list of patents filed by PRO 
inventors. Again, we initially search for name homonyms of these inventors as we did for 
the university faculty. Note that this step also adds the 20% of co-applied patents back into 
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the sample. Now, however, we have identified these not by applicants but PRO inventors. 
This raw list of potential PRO-researcher patents amounts to 195,498 (1978-2011).  
Disambiguation routine – Step 1 
The two lists of retained patent documents are now pooled (492,340). Note again that this 
list includes too many patents because of name homonyms. In addition, some inventors 
may switch between the two groups of institutions and thus appear in both lists. Therefore, 
we then implemented a first disambiguation routine based on the patent document data. 
This step determines which patents are clearly not invented by either university faculty or 
PRO researchers to extent this is possible to infer from the patent data. This initial 
disambiguation leads to a list of 29,476 unique inventors (either university faculty or PRO 
researchers) with a total of 174,431 patents (1978-2011). 
The reason for the large drop in the overall number of patents is the deliberate 
oversampling by using the cleaned name (without title) as selection criterion. For example, 
979 patents are filed under the common German name “Bernd Müller”, a number much too 
high for a single person. After the disambiguation procedure 61 distinct persons were 
identified. Only 3 persons belong to the target group of university faculty or PRO 
researchers, and these 3 inventors have in total 16 patents.  
This disambiguation algorithm is based on a relation network analysis. Every node 
within this network is a patent connected to other patents by layers of relations defined by 
shared applicants, co-inventors, citations and joint sets of IPC codes. The analysis uses a 
hierarchical approach by first traversing connections of high reliability to define sub-clusters 
that function as new nodes for the next iterative step. By aggregating information within 
these ‘hypernodes’ new connections emerge that will also be traversed and so on. As every 
 36 
 
sub-cluster describes a part of an inventor career, suspiciously large sub-clusters can easily 
be identified, rejected and re-traversed with more restrictive requirements for the 
connections. This method implicitly solves the common name problem. The resulting list of 
unique individuals and their corresponding patents has been checked manually to the 
largest extent possible.  
Collecting publication data from the Web of Science and disambiguation - Step 2 
The retained list of initially disambiguated inventors is now used to perform name searches 
in the Thomson Reuters Web of Science publication database, 1990 – 2008.  We first 
retrieve all publications from Web of Science that match with respect to the names in our 
inventor list and have at least one German affiliation. This amounts to 882,702 publications; 
again including name homonyms. Second, we now use the publication information to 
disambiguate these authors from Web of Science using cross-referencing information on 
journals, coauthors, citations and affiliations. 580,448 are identified as being authored by 
the 29,476 inventors in our sample from 1990 to 2008. 
In order to ensure that the match between inventors and authors has a high level of quality 
we then excluded weak matches. For doing so we only keep a researcher based on author-
inventor-link if it is either the only match between author and inventor of the same name or 
if at least one affiliation matches between inventor and author. This reduced our uniquely 
identified researchers to 18,092. 
Compiling the panel database 
The final step of the database construction involves generating a panel of unique academic 
inventors that includes information on their patents, citation-weighted patents and 
publications for each year. We count patents at the family level to ensure that patents in 
 37 
 
different jurisdictions for the same invention are not counted more than once.  The unit of 
observation is a researcher-year. Some of the professors also appear as PRO researchers at 
some point in time.   
The database is an unbalanced panel identifying 18,092 unique researchers with 99,624  
patents and 447,596 publications to originate from a professor or a PRO inventor (overall 
time span).  
The regression sample period that we use in our analysis runs from 1995 through 2008.  
Note that this sample also contains researchers who patented before 1995 in the sample.  
This implies that a researcher does not need to have a patent in the 1995 to 2008 period to 
be in the sample.  We defined the study period to extend from 1995 through 2008 so that 
we observed enough time periods before and after the policy change.  For each inventor, 
our data contains the individual’s history of patenting between 1978 and 2008 and the 
individual’s history of publications between 1990 and 2008.   
Next, we exclude those researchers who were employed at both a PRO and university, as it 
is not clear which patent regime applied to these researchers. This reduces the number of 
observed researchers to 16,291.  Beyond patent and publication characteristics, the data on 
patenting and publication history of every researcher allowed us to calculate each 
researcher’s career age.  Career age starts when we observe the researcher’s first 
publication or patent application and increases incrementally thereafter to a maximum of 
35 years after which we assume the researcher retires.  Dropping researchers after 35 years 
and defining entry into the panel as either first patent or first publication our observed 
number of researchers drops to 15,770.  
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To account for earlier exit from academia, we adopted a 5-year rule that has a researcher 
leaving the panel if he or she had no patenting or publishing activity for five consecutive 
years.14  Researcher industry connections were determined from the patent data.  An 
academic researcher is identified as having an industry connection when he or she is 
observed as an inventor on a company owned patent.  This allows us to distinguish high cost 
and low cost academic inventors prior to the abolishment of Professor’s Privilege and to 
estimate the model on subsamples to test hypotheses 1 and 2.  
As Poisson fixed effects estimations exclude groups with zero outcomes in all periods of the 
panel, our regression sample excludes those researchers with zero patents in the observed 
period (they are in the initial sample as they had patented before 1995 and remain in the 
sample as they had some publishing activity in the last 5 years). Therefore the final 
estimation sample contains 108,263 researcher-year observations, containing 12,012 
researchers (3,718 professors and 8,294 PRO researchers). 
Table 7: Definition of variables 
Variable name Definition 
# Patents The number of patents applied for in year by an 
academic inventor 
# Citation-weighted patents The number of citations received by patents applied 
for in given year in the four subsequent years to the 
application date 
Professor The academic inventor was professor at some point in 
his career 
Career age The number of years elapsed since the academic 
inventor’s first patent or publication 
New policy Dummy for years >= 2002 
Professor*New policy Interaction of Professor dummy and New Policy 
Industry connection The researcher has at least one patent applied for 
jointly with a firm applicant prior to 2001 
Avg Publications A moving average of journal publications over the 
past three years, t-1 to t-3  
 
                                                     
14 In section 6 we present an alternative exit rule; however, the results do not change in a meaningful 
way.  
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